Growth to improve amid gradual disinflation
The underlying growth profile should remain relatively subdued in the Turkish economy for the remainder of 2026, reflecting tight financial conditions (limited loan growth, elevated real interest rates) and softer external demand. Private consumption (around 55% of GDP) is likely to remain slack in the near term as high borrowing costs, slower real credit growth (around 25% as at July 2026 vs. annual inflation of 31.8%) and the cumulative erosion of household purchasing power all curb discretionary spending. Nevertheless, a relative rise in real wages and the gradual decline in inflation should prevent a more pronounced weakness in household demand. Investments (around 30% of GDP) are also likely to remain uneven: high financing costs, weaker profitability, and uncertainty over the demand outlook should continue to weigh on private sector investments, particularly for smaller firms while machinery, automation and productivity enhancing investments by larger corporates should prove more resilient. As monetary policy is expected to become progressively looser and disinflation improves household purchasing power, domestic demand conditions are set to improve in 2027. Private consumption should therefore regain momentum while lower financing costs and improving business confidence should support a broader recovery in investments. The normalisation in domestic demand, potentially reinforced by a more supportive fiscal stance ahead of the electoral cycle (which is scheduled for 2028 but expected to be held sometime in 2027), should drive accelerated growth. However, resulting stronger demand could further complicate the final stage of the disinflation process.
At the sectoral level, the automotive industry is expected to remain relatively resilient, supported by exports and integration into European supply chains. Activity is projected to pick up gradually in 2027 as financing conditions ease and domestic demand recovers. The textile and clothing sectors are likely to remain under pressure due to high labour costs and competition from lower-cost producers. However, conditions may stabilise in 2027, particularly in higher value-added segments. Tourism is expected to remain relatively strong despite the geopolitical uncertainty and weaker price competitiveness. The outlook for the sector should improve further in 2027 provided that regional tensions ease.
The disinflation trend is expected to continue but at a relatively gradual pace. The improvement will initially be associated with weaker demand, tight credit policy and a favourable base effect while services inflation (particularly rents and other backward-looking components such as education) is likely to be considerably stickier than goods inflation. At the same time, the inflation outlook remains exposed to significant upside risks from energy and food prices, geopolitical developments and exchange-rate pass-through. Against this backdrop, we expect the central bank to maintain a cautious, data-dependent easing cycle, prioritising the preservation of sufficiently high real rates rather than pursuing rapid nominal rate cuts. Scope for monetary easing should increase further in 2027 as headline and underlying inflation are set to moderate. However, with economic activity likely to strengthen and fiscal policy potentially more supportive ahead of the elections, the central bank will need to carefully calibrate the pace of cuts to prevent an early recovery in credit and consumption from undermining the disinflation process.
Possible minor easing in fiscal policy ahead of elections, plus narrower external deficit
Türkiye’s fiscal position is expected to gradually improve although the adjustment is unlikely to be linear. The normalisation of earthquake-related reconstruction spending (estimated at around USD 91 billion between 2023-2025), continued strength in nominal tax revenues (up 40% YoY in the January-July 2026 period) and greater expenditure discipline should support fiscal consolidation. At the same time, elevated interest expenditures (around 15% of total expenditures), public sector wage and pension adjustments, and other social spending commitments are likely to slow the pace of improvements. As inflation moderates, the support to nominal tax revenues from high inflation will gradually shrink, making tighter control over recurrent government spending and improvements in expenditure efficiency increasingly important to enable sustained fiscal consolidation. In addition, fiscal policy may become less restrictive as the elections approach, with presidential and parliamentary elections currently scheduled for 2028, or possibly earlier. Overall, the relatively low and stable public debt burden provides an important buffer and leaves Türkiye in a comparatively favourable position among emerging-market economies. However, as monetary policy is expected to ease and domestic demand recover, maintaining a sufficiently restrictive fiscal stance will be important, particularly to ensure that fiscal policy does thwart the disinflation process.
The external balance is expected to remain stronger than in earlier periods of domestic demand-led growth. Tighter financial conditions and the still-moderate pace of private consumption are expected to continue acting as a brake on import demand in the near term, while tourism (10% of GDP) and other services revenues provide an important source of foreign-exchange earnings. The energy balance (net energy imports stood around 3% of GDP in 2025) will remain an important determinant of the outlook, leaving the current account sensitive to developments in global oil and natural gas prices. In the wake of disinflation and monetary policy easing, the recovery in private consumption and investment is expected to generate stronger demand for imports of consumer goods and equipment, which respectively accounted for 18% and 15% of total imports in 2025. Nevertheless, continued export growth, tourism and a more balanced composition of growth (less credit-intensive and import-oriented) should allow the current account position to further improve despite the acceleration in economic activity. This would represent an important qualitative improvement in Türkiye’s growth profile by reducing its external financing requirement and vulnerability to shifts in global risk appetite. The durability of this adjustment will ultimately depend on maintaining competitiveness and increasing the share of longer-term financing, particularly foreign direct investment, while continued international reserve accumulation would provide an additional buffer against external shocks. The improvement in the current account should facilitate this accumulation. The trend is already evident, with total international reserves climbing to USD 178.4 billion (around 110% of Türkiye’s short-term external debt stock) and net reserves excluding swaps reaching USD 50.6 billion as at August 2026, primarily driven by fresh foreign exchange purchases by the central bank and higher global gold valuations.
Rising diplomatic role in a fragile region, domestic attention focused on elections
Türkiye’s geopolitical position presents both significant opportunities and risks. Its strategic location, NATO membership and economic ties with Africa, Central Asia, Europe and the Middle East have bolstered its importance amid growing global fragmentation. Improved relations with the EU—which would involve, in particular, progress in modernising the customs union (agriculture and services are excluded, but Türkiye must align itself with the EU’s free trade agreements) and strengthened cooperation in defence and the industrial sector—would boost exports and foreign direct investment. Türkiye’s ability to maintain good relations with the US, the EU, Russia, Ukraine and the Gulf states has enhanced its role as a regional hub in the areas of trade, energy and diplomacy. At the same time, its immediate neighbours pose a major geopolitical risk. Stabilisation and reconstruction in Syria could create opportunities for Turkish companies in the construction, trade and infrastructure sectors. However, a resurgence of regional tensions could increase instability. A prolonged and widespread conflict, leading to disruption of regional energy flows, would be particularly detrimental to Türkiye due to rising energy import costs, a slowdown in tourism, a widening current account deficit, a spike in inflation and currency pressures.
Domestic political developments are likely to continue to be an important source of uncertainty in 2026-2027, particularly as attention will gradually shift towards the next presidential and parliamentary elections, currently scheduled for 2028. However, an earlier vote cannot be ruled out. Such a decision would require a three-fifths parliamentary majority, meaning that the governing alliance would need support from outside its existing parliamentary bloc.

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